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Appellee/Defendant Community Nursing Services ("CNS"), by and through its 
undersigned counsel of record, hereby files this Brief in opposition to the appeal filed by 
Plaintiff (hereafter "Plaintiff") in the above-captioned matter. 
JURISDICTION 
Assuming that Plaintiff timely filed a Notice of Appeal, an issue addressed in more 
detail below, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues for resolution by this Court: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in entering an Order and Judgment on 
December 23, 1994 dismissing Plaintiffs Complaints which sought to hold CNS liable in tort 
for absolutely privileged statements it made during the course of an EEOC investigation.1 
2. Whether Plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal.2 
3. Whether Plaintiff should be held liable for costs on this appeal. 
The first issue is a legal issue that this Court reviews for correctness without 
deference to the summary judgment ruling of the trial court. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Cahoon 
1
 By its own express terms, Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal is clearly limited to seeking 
review of the Order and Judgment dated December 23, 1994 (Addendum "E"). Thus, this 
Court has not been asked to determine whether the trial court acted properly in denying 
various post-judgment motions filed by Plaintiff. These post-judgment motions are discussed 
below in the section outlining the course of the proceedings before the trial court. 
2
 This issue was first raised with this Court when CNS filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition on March 3, 1995. The Court denied this Motion in an Order dated June 21, 
1995. To the extent that this issue can still be raised during the course of the normal appeal 
processes, CNS does so here and presents its argument later in this brief. To the extent this 
issue has been finally resolved by the Order dated June 21, 1995, counsel for CNS 
apologizes in advance for presenting this argument again. 
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and Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah 1994). The second and third issues 
relate to the appeal itself and were not part of the trial court proceedings. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on CNS for statements that are 
absolutely privileged because they were allegedly made during the course of a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding, specifically an investigation by the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") into an age discrimination charge Plaintiff filed. The 
EEOC ruled in favor of CNS on this charge. A true and correct copy of the EEOC's decision 
(which was also presented to the trial court below) is attached hereto as Addendum "A." 
Because the statements at issue are absolutely privileged, Plaintiffs claims are not actionable, 
were properly dismissed by the trial court. This Court should affirm that ruling. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
After she was discharged by CNS for performance issues, Plaintiff filed an age 
discrimination charge with the EEOC. During the course of investigating this charge, the 
EEOC spoke to several current and former employees of CNS. On August 30, 1994, the 
EEOC issued a written Determination and Right to Sue letter stating there was no reasonable 
cause to conclude Plaintiff had been the victim of discrimination. The Right to Sue letter 
stated, "Following this dismissal, the Charging Party may only pursue this matter by filing 
suit against the Respondent named in the charge within 90 days of the receipt of this letter. 
Otherwise, the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost." (See Addendum "A") (emphasis in 
original). 
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Instead of filing such a discrimination lawsuit, however, on or about October 12, 
1994, acting pro se, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against CNS entitled: "Complaint for Financial 
Loss and Severe Emotional and Physical Stress for: Defamation of Personal and Professional 
Character." Record at 2-3 (Addendum "B"). The Complaint's prayer for relief stated, 
"Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants for defamation of personal and professional 
character...." Record at 3. On or about October 19, 1994, Plaintiff filed an amendment to this 
Complaint stating, "Plaintiff charges Defendant with making defamatory remarks...." Record at 
10-13 (Addendum "C"). On their face, both Complaints plainly sought to impose defamation 
liability on CNS for statements allegedly made during the EEOC investigation. 
On November 1, 1994, CNS filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary 
Judgment. Record at 38-58. The basis for this Motion was that CNS was absolutely privileged 
from any alleged defamation liability for statements allegedly made during the course of the 
EEOC investigation. CNS presented a copy of the EEOC Determination (Addendum "A") to 
the trial court as an exhibit to its motion. 
On or about November 7, 1994, Plaintiff filed a document opposing CNS' motion and 
entitled "Motion to Deny Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment Requested by Defendant and 
Grant Summary Judgment to Plaintiff." Record at 59-82. The trial court held a hearing on all 
these matters on December 12, 1994 and took them under advisement. 
Later that same day, the trial court issued a minute entry treating CNS' motion as a 
request for summary judgment, granting summary judgment "for the reasons specified in the 
supporting memoranda" and requesting CNS' counsel to prepare an order and judgment. 
Record at 93 (Addendum "D"). On December 23, 1994, the court signed and entered an Order 
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and Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Complaints because the statements allegedly made by CNS 
were absolutely privileged. Record at 119-21 (Addendum "E"). 
In the meantime, Plaintiff filed a pleading dated December 20, 1994, asking the court 
to reverse its judgment and to add the following claims to the Complaints which had already 
been dismissed by the order contained in the minute entry: 
• "Plaintiff charges Defendant with perjury under oath, violation of Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 76-8-504 and sec. 76-8-504." [written in hand above: 
"76-8-502"]. 
• "Plaintiff charges Defendant with communication fraud, violation of 
Utah Code, [sic] Ann. sec. 76-10-1801." 
• "The defamation of the Plaintiffs character was committed by perjury 
under oath and was done for the purpose of obtaining a decision from 
the EEOC in their favor...." 
• "Plaintiff charges Defendant with the tort of outrage...." 
Record at 100-15 (emphasis in original). On or about December 22, 1994, CNS filed a 
memorandum in opposition to this Motion. Record at 116-17. 
On or about December 30, 1994, Plaintiff filed another motion to "Reverse 
Judgment" and "Amend Complaint," replacing the previous motion seeking to add the same 
claims discussed above and asking for oral argument. Record at 126-31 (Addendum "F"). On 
or about January 5, 1995, the court denied the request for oral argument on this Motion and 
indicated it would rule on it when properly submitted for decision. Record at 132-33. 
On or about January 9, 1995, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Request for 
Decision." See Addendum "G."3 Rather than merely submitting her motion for decision, 
3
 Counsel for CNS could not locate any reference to this pleading in the record index 
prepared by the trial court. 
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however, for the first time, Plaintiff explained in detail that she was seeking to add not only the 
new claims oudined above, but also an age discrimination claim based on the original EEOC 
charge. CNS objected to the same and filed a memorandum in support of this objection. 
Record at 134-40. 
The court denied Plaintiffs Motion in a minute entry dated January 12, 1995. 
Record at 141-42. On or about January 13, 1995, Plaintiff filed a reply to the objections filed 
by CNS, Record at 144-47, as well as her own objection to what she termed a "hasty decision" 
made by the court on the motion she herself had already submitted for decision on January 9, 
1995. Record at 143. 
Bending over backwards to be fair to Plaintiff, on January 18, 1995 the trial court 
issued a minute entry setting aside its previous minute entry of January 12, 1995 and indicating 
the matter would be ruled on when submitted for decision. Record at 150-51. On or about 
January 20, 1995, Plaintiff again submitted for decision her motion to "Reverse Judgment" and 
"Amended Complaint". Record at 152-53. In a minute entry dated January 26, 1995, the trial 
court denied Plaintiffs' Motion "for the reasons specified in Defendant's responding 
memorandum." Record at 154-55. The court signed an Order to the same effect on February 
8, 1995. Record at 156-57 (Addendum "H"). 
On or about February 22, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the final 
Judgment entered by the court on December 23, 1994. Record at 159-61 (Addendum "I"). 
This Notice was filed fully 61 days after the final Judgment appealed from was entered. In a 
Motion for Summary Disposition filed March 3, 1995, CNS sought dismissal of this matter on 
the merits and because Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed two months after the entry of final 
131367 1 5 
judgment and thus the appeal was not timely and this Court had no jurisdiction over the same. 
In an Order dated June 21, 1995, this Court denied this Motion and ordered the Parties to 
follow the normal appeal process.4 
4
 As noted above under the Statement of Issues section, to the extent this issue of 
timeliness can still be raised as part of this appeal, CNS now does so and provides the 
following brief statement of why it believes jurisdiction is lacking and why this appeal can 
and should be dismissed for this reason alone. 
The failure to timely file a notice of appeal means that an appellate court has no 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Nelson v. Stoker. 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. 
Riverton City. 656 P. 2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321-22 
(Utah 1982). As Plaintiff concedes in her Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement here, 
the final judgment in this case was entered on December 23, 1995. Both the Notice of 
Appeal and Docketing Statement expressly indicate that it is this December 23, 1995 final 
judgment from which Plaintiff appeals. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that an appeal must be 
brought within thirty (30) days of "the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from." Thus, Plaintiffs deadline to file an appeal from the final judgment was January 23, 
1995. Plaintiff missed this deadline by a substantial amount of time; her Notice of Appeal 
was filed February 22, 1995, fully sixty-one (61) days after the entry of final judgment. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the time to file a notice of 
appeal to be tolled only under specific, limited circumstances, namely the filing of a motion 
for judgment under Rule 50(b), to amend or make additional findings under Rule 52(b) or 
Rule 59, or for a new trial under Rule 59. None of those circumstances exists here. 
Plaintiff filed post-judgment motions to "Reverse Judgment" and "Amend Complaint" 
and the memoranda in support of these motions consisted largely of pleas for reconsideration, 
re-argument of the issues previously resolved by the trial court and statements in support of 
her allegation that she should be able to assert criminal and other claims. None of these 
motions should serve to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure plainly do not allow the filing of a motion to 
amend a complaint to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Thus, the only question is 
whether Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration tolls this time period. It does not. 
(continued...) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because CNS moved to dismiss this matter below, it properly assumed, for the 
purposes of that motion, only that the facts stated in the Complaints were true. CNS submitted 
only the EEOC Determination for consideration beyond the pleadings. Accordingly, there are 
no factual or background matters to discuss with this Court that have not already been addressed 
above. 
4
 (...continued) 
None of the circumstances allowing tolling exist here. Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure allows a party to seek a judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict. Plaintiff 
here made no such motion nor could she, as there was no jury verdict to seek to overturn. 
Rule 52(b) allows a party to move to amend a judgment and/or add additional 
findings. Plaintiffs motions did no such thing and rather simply sought for the trial court to 
completely change its mind and reverse its decision. Furthermore, there were no factual 
findings to amend, as the trial court ruled as a matter of law against Plaintiffs claims. 
Finally, Rule 59 allows a party to seek a new trial. Plaintiffs motion could not 
possibly have been made pursuant to Rule 59 as there was no trial in the first place. 
Plaintiffs motion was, at best, not one for a new trial but one for a "new summary 
judgment" asking the court to change its mind. In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), because a motion captioned "motion for reconsideration" of a 
summary judgment ruling was essentially treated by the trial court as a motion for a new 
trial, the Court ruled that the time for filing a notice of appeal was tolled. IdL at 1064-65. 
Plaintiffs motion to "Reverse Judgment" here was not treated as a new trial motion, and in 
fact, the Order denying it specifically stated that the motion was treated as a motion for 
reconsideration. See Order dated February 8, 1995 (See Addendum "G"). If Plaintiffs 
motion to "Reverse Judgment" here tolls the appeal time, every motion for reconsideration, 
and every "hey-Judge-please-change-your-mind" motion must be held to do so. They will 
then be filed after every dispositive order in the trial courts, something at odds with the clear 
intent of the applicable rules that only certain post-judgment motions toll the time to file a 
notice of appeal. 
Thus, there was no tolling under Rule 4(b) of Plaintiffs time to file a notice of 
appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs appeal is not timely and should be dismissed. 
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Plaintiff evidences a chronic inability to understand that CNS admitted the facts 
alleged in her Complaints solely for the purposes of its Motion to Dismiss, a point CNS 
expressly stated in its pleadings and in oral argument. (See, e.g., partial transcript of argument 
attached hereto as Addendum "J"). CNS has denied Plaintiffs allegations all along, but moved 
for dismissal because even if Plaintiffs allegations are true, she cannot prevail.5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on CNS for statements she alleges its witnesses 
made during an EEOC investigation. Because any such statements made during this quasi-
judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, Plaintiffs claims are not actionable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF FROM SEEKING 
TO IMPOSE LIABILITY FOR STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE DURING 
A JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
The essence of Plaintiffs lawsuit against CNS, despite her numerous attempts to 
redefine it each time it was rejected by the trial court, has been to try to impose some type of 
tort liability on CNS for statements allegedly made about her during the course of responding to 
the discrimination charge she filed with the EEOC. This is obvious from a cursory review of 
her Complaint and Amended Complaints, as well as from the statement of issues on pp. 2-3 of 
5
 Plaintiffs endless harping on this point and unfounded accusations of criminal or 
unprofessional conduct related to the same are completely distorted, unfounded, inappropriate 
and should not be tolerated, even from a gro se litigant. Equally disturbing are Plaintiffs 
unprovoked attacks against Judge Frederick, who conducted himself with professionalism and 
dignity (and with great, if undeserved, patience toward Plaintiff) throughout this process. It 
certainly is Plaintiffs right to disagree with the results to date of this litigation. It is not her 
right, however, to litigate this appeal by way of insults and ugly, meritless accusations. She 
should be sanctioned for such conduct. 
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her Docketing Statement. Thus, no matter how she attempts to reframe her lawsuit (and she 
tried to do so quite often before the trial court), as a matter of law there is no basis for 
imposing any liability on CNS under these circumstances because these alleged statements are 
privileged. 
It is well-established that there is an absolute privilege from liability for statements 
made during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings. See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. §§ 587-588 (1977) (hereafter cited as "Restatement"):6 Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts, § 114, pp. 816-819 (1984) (hereafter cited as "Prosser"). This privilege 
"is based upon the public interest in according to all men the utmost freedom of access to the 
courts of justice for the settlement of their private disputes." Restatement § 587, comment (a). 
The privilege applies to any sort of judicial or administrative proceeding, in any of the branches 
of government, where a type of judicial function is performed. Id. at § 585, comment (c); 
Prosser. at § 114, pp. 818-819. 
6
 Restatement Section 587 states: 
A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or defendant in a 
criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter 
concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, 
a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some 
relation to the proceeding. 
Restatement Section 588 states: 
A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter 
concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, 
if it has some relation to the proceeding. 
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Utah follows this rule of law. See Allen v. Ortez. 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990). Utah 
has also codified an absolute privilege into its statutory law. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-2-3(2), 
45-2-10(2)7 
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court relied on both the Restatement and Prosser as 
discussed above and stated: 
One of the absolute privileges is that granted to participants in judicial 
proceedings. The general rule is that judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants and 
counsel in judicial proceedings have an absolute privilege against 
defamation, [citations omitted] This privilege is premised on the 
assumption that the integrity of the judicial system requires that there be 
free and open expression by all participants and that this will only occur if 
they are not inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation suits, [citations 
omitted]. 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(2) states: 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be considered as 
libelous or slanderous per se, is one made: 
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any statement made in 
any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official 
proceeding authorized by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-10(2) states: 
A privileged broadcast which shall not be considered as libelous, 
slanderous, or defamatory per se, is one made: 
(2) In any broadcast of or any statement made in any legislative 
or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding 
authorized by law. 
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Id. u regardless of 
whether the statements at issue are true or false. See, &JL., Williams v. Standard Examiner 
Pub. Co., 2? P.id I, I I (Utah 1933) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Allen outlined three elements necessary to any successful 
claim of absolute privilege: 
First, the statement must have been made during or in the course of a 
judicial proceeding, [footnote omitted]. Second, the statement must have 
some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding, [citation omitted]. 
Finally, the one claiming the privilege must have been acting in the capacity 
of a judge, juror, witness, litigant or counsel in the proceedings at the time 
of the alleged defamation. 
802 P,2d at 1312-13 As the trial court properly found line, .ill Hun,: nl (Iicuj euiain MV 
satisfied in the case at hand. 
First, on its face, Plaintiffs initial Complaints plainly allege that the statements at 
if I ilio f'hOC proceedings and thus this fact is not disputed. 
See Record at 2 3, 1043 (Addenda "B and "( ') 
Setni" * • i'' J11 « i' i «" i' < i< 11 Plaintiff was terminated from her employment 
with CNS and whether these were the true reasons or a pretext for alleged discrimination, 
essential inquiries in any EH « " uivtMiyjlmii. See ojj., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986) 
affd 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cu vmii) I Ims, the alleged statemei 5 
reference to the EEOC proceedings. 
Finally,, it is not disputed that Plaintiffs initial Complaint .nil hull's l in si alt' ills in 
i"NS, which VVJ IIKMIIV .I litigant in the EEOC matter. See Record at 2-3, 1043 (Addenda 
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"B" and WC"). Moreover, the persons who presented evidence on behalf of CNS were 
witnesses. Thus, the absolute privilege as outlined in Allen applies here. 
The same result has been reached in very similar cases involving EEOC proceedings. 
See Thomas v. Petrulis. 465 N.E.2d 1059 (111. Ct. App. 1984); Hurst v. Farmer. 697 P.2d 280 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). review denied 103 Wash. 1038 (1985). 
In the Thomas case, the plaintiff filed a libel action claiming he was defamed by 
statements made by the defendant in a charge of discrimination the defendant had filed with the 
EEOC. The court dismissed the defamation claim, holding that the EEOC was a quasi-judicial 
body and that statements made during the course of such proceedings before the EEOC were 
absolutely privileged. 465 N.E. 2d at 1061-64. Clearly this is a correct decision, as the EEOC 
possesses all the necessary characteristics to be classified as a quasi-judicial entity. Id. 
In the Hurst case, virtually identical to the case at hand, the plaintiff claimed he was 
defamed by documents and statements provided by his former employer to the EEOC during the 
course of the EEOC's investigation of the plaintiffs discrimination charge. The court 
concluded that such statements were absolutely privileged and could not support a defamation 
action. 697 P.2d at 282. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion when plaintiffs have used other tort 
theories besides defamation, such as the ton of outrage, to try to impose liability for statements 
made during the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. See Correllas v. Viveiros. 
572 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Mass. 1991) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant because 
statements made in judicial proceeding were absolutely privileged and thus could not support 
131367.1 12 
either a defamation claim «ti • i Ltiiii I> >m I iimim! mllitli n nil r in Hinu'll Ji^iress» Doe >. 
Blake. 809 F. Supp. 1020, 1027-28 (D. Conn. 1992) (same).8 
The same public policy reasons that suppi I in mi iiiiii iiiKuimti |iii\iKf»tj i J|I|IIIHI n a 
defamation claim must preclude an "outrage" or similar tort or other claims that make the same 
basic assertions based on privileged statements. To do otherwise wc uld :irci lm * ent a nd 
abrogate iIn absolute privilege that is necessary for judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings to be 
conducted with the free and open expression required for resolution. Initio m liiiiJutjnii mjst 
nhibited by the threat of lawsuits based on the information they 
presented in the proceeding.9 
8
 This point is probably irrelevant to this appeal as the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs 
post-judgment efforts to amend her Complaints to assert the tort of outrage is not even before 
this Court as part of this appeal. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal expressly states that the 
Judgment she appeals from is the December 23, 1994 Order and Judgment which dismissed 
Plaintiffs first two Complaints that contained no reference to the tort of outrage. The court 
ruled on the post-judgment motions later 
The same is true regarding Plaintiffs apparent effort (dated January 9, 1995) to assert 
an age discrimination claim, a request made (in a notice to submit) over two weeks after the 
entry of the December 23, 1994 Order and Judgment appealed from. Even if this issue is 
somehow properly before this Court, however, Plaintiffs claim would fail. The right to sue 
letter issued to Plaintiff on August 30, 1994 expressly required her to sue within 90 days or 
lose her right to sue altogether. Thus to be timely, Plaintiffs claim for discrimination should 
have been filed no later than December 1, 1994. Plaintiff clearly missed this filing deadline 
and thus is precluded from pursuing this claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (". . . within 
ninety days after the giving of such [right to sue] notice a civil action may be brought. . . ."; 
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1984) (also concluding 
at n. 3 that relation back provision of Rule 15(c) does not apply in circumstances of that 
case); Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1979) (claim 
brought beyond 90 days barred); Flaherty v. Illinois Department of Corrections. F. 
Supp. , 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6336, *4 (N.D. 111. 1995) ("pro se litigants must abide 
by the filing requirements imposed by Congress"). 
9
 Moreover, the conduct allegt. , / to suppoit 
(continued...) 
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Accordingly, the trial court acted properly in not allowing Plaintiff to attempt to 
impose tort liability on CNS for statements allegedly made by CNS to the EEOC investigator 
deciding how to rule on Plaintiffs charges. This Court should affirm that decision made by the 
trial court in this case. 
n. CNS SHOULD BE AWARDED APPROPRIATE COSTS AND DAMAGES 
BECAUSE THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
For the reasons outlined above, this appeal is frivolous and completely without merit. 
Plaintiff has also conducted this appeal in an ugly and insulting manner that should not be 
tolerated even from a pro se litigant. Therefore, CNS respectfully requests that it be awarded 
costs and damages under Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
9
 (...continued) 
any outrage tort cause of action. A similar situation arose in Hurst v. Farmer. 697 P.2d 280 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). In that case, the court held that statements made by the 
representatives of an employer during an EEOC proceeding were absolutely privileged. Id. 
at 282. The plaintiff in Hurst also alleged the tort of outrage. Id. The court rejected the 
claim as a matter of law, stating: 
Altier's [the employer representative] conduct, as a matter of law, was 
not so "extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community." 
*** 
It should be noted that the employer was required by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act to investigate the complaints against Hurst 
and the action taken was well within the spirit of that Act. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.. 712 F. Supp. 1514, 
1521-22 (D. Utah 1989) (mere termination does not constitute outrageous conduct to support 
tort); Larson v. Svsco Corp.. 767 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1989) (same). 
As in Hurst, here CNS was required to investigate and respond to the allegations and 
charge filed by Plaintiff and it did so well within in the spirit of the law. Thus, CNS' 
actions are privileged and do not support any claim of the tort of outrage. 
131367.1 14 
CONCLUSIONS 
Because CNS's statements were allegedly made during the course of and plainly 
relc I iln I I M proceeding initiated by Plaintiff, and thus are absolutely privileged, 
Plaintiffs claim in this case fails, the trial court acted properly in IJISUIL%MIII» m .mil ilirrr n 
substantial basis for any review of that decision. Accordingly, CNS respectfully requests this 
costs and damages. 
n.\TH» MiisP"^ day of July, 1995. 
JONES, .. ^ VlcuuNOUGH 
Michael Patrick O'Brien 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Community 
Nursing Services 
I.'!! ,16U 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Q"\ >" day of July, 1995 I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S/DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, 
to the following: 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
Box 786 
Park Valley, Utah 84329 
Jkkkdfihkk^^ 
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EXHIBFT V 
r
 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN1T AMISSION 
Phoenix District Office Phoenix District Office 
4520 N". Central Avenue, Suite 300 
Phoenix, AZ 85012-1848 
(602) 640-5000 
Charge 
Theresa F. Thompson Charging Party 
P. 0. Box 786 
Park Valley, IJT 84329 
Community Nursing Services Respondent 
3 050 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4i i \ 
Under _..- authority vested in me by the Commission, I issue the 
following determination as to the merits of the above cited charge. 
All requirements for coverage have been met. Charging Party 
alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, in 
that she was harassed by being issued written warnings and 
terminated from her position as PRN due to her age, 53,, and in 
retaliation for complaining about harassment. 
Examination of the evidence indicates Charging Party was terminated 
from the position of PRN because of unsatisfactory job performance. 
Records show that Charging Party was issued numerous written and 
verbal warnings regarding her job performance, including two 
written warnings issued prior to her complaint of harassment. The 
evidence shows that persons over the age of 40 continue to be 
employed and employees under the age of 40 have been terminated. 
Further evidence reveals that Charging Party was hired at the age 
of 52 and terminated at 53. There was no evidence to indicate that 
age was a factor in the decision to terminate Charging Party. 
Additionally, while Charging Party alleges discrimination under 
Title VII
 v of ^  the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the 
investigating did not substantiate any violation under this Act. 
Based oif&&£SB analysis, I have determined that the evidence 
obtained Jhpria? the investigation does not establish a violati on of 
the statu€*ffc>. 
This determination and dismissal concludes the processing of this 
charge. This letter will be the only notice of dismissal and the 
only notice of the Charging Party's right to sue sent by the 
Commission. Following this dismissal, the Charging Party may only 
pursue this matter by filing suit against the Respondent named in 
the charge within 90 days of receipt of this letter. Otherwise, 
the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost. 
If the charge was filed within 300 days of the alleged 
discrimination, Charging Party may sue under the ADEA for recovery 
of backpay, an equal amount as liquidated damages, appropriate 
make-whole or injunctive relief, and attorneys/ fees and court 
costs. 
AUG 301994 , IL., (A* 
Date i^ Charlefe. D. ©urtner 
r District Director 
OCT-14-1994 12:38 
THERESA F- THOMPSON 
PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELT 
BOX 786 
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329 
NO PHONE 
EXHIBIT ffB" 
I THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SA1 ,w |,A*T, COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA i. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSP 
l > e t tnji].*M'i i 
COMPLAINT FOE FINANCIAL LOSS AND 
SEVERE EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL STRESS FOR: 
DEFAMATION OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
CHARACTER 
Case No 
,^gu 
COMES NOk Theresa F. Thompson, as and for a f-;l«,; T >• :$E 
OF ACTION against the Defendants loi DEFAMATION OF PERSONAl AND PROFESSIONAL 
;;; alleges: 
1 , Theresa F. Thompson, lives and resiae ' ; west 
•ve Creek Road, Park v-n. 1J t v , iti.r Elder County, Utah. 
2, Defendant, Community Nursing 5e a Home Health Agency, 
i* r.heState of Utah—-having its principa operations 
in Salt lane MOU:-' main office at 2970 South Main, South s« 1.1 Lake 
Lity, Utah 84115. 
j. i.ue events described herein originated in Salt Lake County. 
OCT-14-1994 12:38 
P.04/10 
4. The matter in controversy exceedsf exclusive of interest and costs 
the sum of ten thousand dollars. 
5. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from January 2, 1991 until 
on or about March 22, 1993 as a visiting Registered Nurse, 
6. Because of harassment by a supervisor, Plaintiff tried five times 
during 1991 to change employers but without sucess. 
7. Plaintiff's employment was terminated by Defendant in March, 1993. 
8. Plaintiff filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission in Phoenix, Arizona. 
9. On or around the 15th of August, 1994, Sharon Hencky, investigator 
for the EEOC, contacted the Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's charges of: 
1) treating client in an uncaring, dangerous manner; 2) filthy, unkeznp 
appearance; 3) insubordination; 4) substandard performance; 5) poor 
interpersonal relationships. 
10. Since Plaintiff had not heard these charges or the half truths 
and outright lies that had been used to support these charges before, Plaintiff 
was thrown into severe emotional stress that contributed to an acute episode 
of diverticulitis that landed Plaintiff in Logan Hospital for nine days. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants for defamation 
of personal and professional character leading to: 1) loss of employment; 
2) loss of professional reputation; 3) loss of personal reputation, 4) severe 
physical and emotional stress; the sum of $ 3,000,000 (three million dollars). 
<^2flfltfA£- y '^J?*T*fo**^ 
Plaintiff representing self 
Plaintiff's Name and Address 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Box 786 
Park Valley, Utah 84329 
2 
OCT-21-1994 I * * 
THERESA F. THOMPSON 
PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF 
BOX 786 
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 04323 
NO PHONE 
P.03/03 
EXHIBIT "C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE, 
Defendant. 
AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 940906495 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff/ Theresa F. Thompson to amend the Complaint by adding 
the following: 
11) Plaintiff charges Defendant with making defamatory remarks 
in writing and verbally about Plaintiff*s appearance, compassion towards 
other people, ability to cooperate with others, professional performance, 
ability to relate to other people, intellect and education. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant for: 
1) an additional $ 2,000,000 (two million -dollars) for a total 
of $ 5,000,000 (five million dollars) 
2) all court and lawyer fees. 
Plaintiff representing self 
TOTAL P.03 
OCT-21-1994 145 56 P.02/03 
CERTIFICATE OF HAJLIMG 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Amendment to Complaint by certified mail prepaid to: 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE 
2970 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84115 
PATED this day of 
Theresa F. Thompson 
EXHIBIT "D' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMPSON, THERESA F 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 940906495 CV 
DATE 12/12/94 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PURSUANT TO THE HEARING HELD DECEMBER 12, 1994, THE COURT 
RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION HEREIN TREATED AS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS ARE CONSIDERED IS GRANTED 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE SUPPORTING MEMORANDA. 
2. COUNSEL FOR MOVANT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT. 
Case No: 940906495 CV 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the \ ^ day of X)2<T , P^H , 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
THERESA F THOMPSON MICHAEL PATRICK OBRIEN 
Plaintiff Atty for Defendant 
BOX 786 1500 FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA 
PARK VALLEY UT 84329 170 SO MAIN, P.O. BOX 45444 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0444 
District Court Clerk 
By: fV. ?WWmLL 
Deputy Cler) 
1 
EXHIBIT "E" 
Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
Civil No. 940906495CV 
vs. : 
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick) 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE & 
HOSPICE, : 
Defendant. 
On December 12, 1994, the court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
the above-captioned matter. Plaintiff appeared in person and represented herself. Defendant 
Community Nursing Service & Hospice was represented by its counsel of record, Michael 
Patrick O'Brien of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The court, having reviewed the 
written submissions of me parties, heard oral argument and issued a minute entry granting 
Defendant's Motion, and for good cause shown; 
108239.1 
? *1 t ' - i 
t . XJ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
A. Defendant's Motion shall be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Based on the allegations in the Complaints and other submissions, the court 
concludes that the statements alleged by the Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaints 
to create defamation liability are absolutely privileged statements because they: were made 
during the course or judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings before the United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), bore some reference to such EEOC 
proceedings, and were made by parties, witnesses and/or litigants in such proceedings. 
C. Summary judgment is granted to Defendant on Plaintiffs Complaint and all 
Amended Complaints, which are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this jU^aSy of December, 1994. 
108239 1 2 
PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF 
BOX 786 
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329 
NO PHONE 
EXHIBIT "Fff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION: 1) REVERSE JUDGMENT 
2) AMEND COMPLAINT 
3) REQUEST HEARING FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT 
Civil No. 940906495 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59, 60(b), and 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Plaintiff Theresa F. Thompson respectfully requests the Court: 
1. To reverse the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
2. To correctly name and charge elements in the Original Complaint. 
12) Plaintiff charges Defendant with providing false testamony in 
an official proceeding, violation of Utah Codes Ann. sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, 
and sec. 76-8-504. (See paragraph 10 of original complaint.) 
13) Plaintiff charges Defendant with communication fraud, violation 
of Utah Code, Ann. sec. 76-10-1801. 
15) Plaintiff charges Defendant with Tort of Outrage. The Original 
Complaint reads: Complaint for Financial Loss and Severe Emotional and Physical 
Stress for;-Defamation of Personal and Professional Chararacter. I n addition to 
the original $3,000,000 requested, the Plaintiff asks an additional $1,000,000 
per day of hospital stay of nine days. ($9,000,000) 
The basis of this Motion is that the original Complaint ( which is not 
a charge of Defamation) was not addressed by the Defendant and justice has 
not yet been served. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant her Motion. 
DATED thisj^day of 22£S_> 199A • 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Plaintiff representing self. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion 
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to: Michael Patrick O'Brien 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
J^U^u^ ^y/UryQ**^ /q/s</9<{ 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Box 786 
Park Valley, Utah 84329 
This Motion and Supporting Memorandum replaces and voids the Motion 
and Supporting Memorandum filed on or about December 20, 1994. 
NJ^U^^ J- ^ >^/>^vt /S/j^fVy 
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PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF 
BOX 786 
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329 
NO PHONE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ' 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE, \ 
Defendant. 
> REQUEST FOR DECISION 
Civil No, 940906495 CV 
, Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff requests that the Court rule on the following matters and 
in the following ways pursuant to Rule 4-501 C.J.A. : 
1. Tort of Outrage—Misunderstandings concerning the charge are based 
on Plaintiff's use of the term"'defamation'. Paragraph 10 of Original 
ComplaintAdescribes false testamony about Plaintiff's character and events 
but was defined by Plaintiff as 'defamation'. Because the Charge: 1) does 
not attempt to create a defamation liability; 2) is for extreme mental and 
emotional harm created by the 'defamation' (false testamony)—the specific 
statements made by Defendant are irrelevant (any false testamony would have 
created the same stressful situation described in the MemorandumA; 3) and is 
based on the fact that Defendant dared present false testamony to a Federal 
Commission creating the stress leading to the harm described in Memorandum, 
the Plaintiff requests a decision in her favor on the Tort of Outrage. 
EXHIBIT 
2. Defamation of Character—Because it is in the Court's power to decide 
to grant or deny a claim to absolute privilege, Plaintiff requests a decision 
against the Defendant's claim for absolute privilege based on the arguments in 
the Memorandum and a judgment in the Defamation charge in favor of the Plaintiff 
that justice may be served. 
3. Violation of Utah Codes Ann, sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, and sec. 76-8-504 
and 76-10-1801: that Defendant be charged with these violations. 
4. Discrimination and Harrassment by Defendant towards the Plaintiff 
during her two years of employment by Defendant. This is the original charge 
placed before the EE0C. Plaintiff charges the Defendant's with this charge 
now and asks relief in the amount of $2,000,000 (two million dollars) Plaintiff 
argues that if the Plaintiff needed to use false testamony to get a decision 
in their favor by the EE0C, then the truth would have given a decision in 
favor of the Plaintiff (Charging Party).(This Motion would have been requested 
during an oral argument if a hearing had been granted. Plaintiff has been 
advised to place everything before the Court.) 
Plaintiff respectfully requests a decision from the Court on each of 
these matters. 
DATED this 7 day of ^J**"* ' , 1995, 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Plaintiff representing self 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of ±he foregoing Request 
for Decision and Original Complaint and Amendment/) to: Michael Patrick O'Brien 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
^ i 
Theresa F. Thompson 
EXHIBIT "H 
Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE & 
HOSPICE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940906495CV 
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick) 
On December 12, 1994, the court issued a minute entry granting summary 
judgment to Defendant in the above-captioned matter. On December 23, 1994, the court 
entered Final Judgment in favor of Defendant. After the court granted summary judgment, 
Plaintiff filed various motions which appear to be motions for reconsideration and/or motions 
to amend her dismissed complaint. Defendant has opposed all such motions. The court, 
having reviewed all the written submissions of the parties and being fully informed about the 
111228 1 
same and for good cause shown and having issued a minute entry on January 26, 1995 
denying Plaintiffs Motions; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs motions are denied. The basis for 
this denial are the reasons specified by Defendant in the various pleadings it has filed in 
opposition to such motions. 
DATED this ff/^day of February, 1995. 
BY THE/fcoURT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 1995, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to the following: 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
Box 786 
Park Valley, Utah 84329 
A^cW Q^rtcK^M^ 
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EXHIBIT "1 !!!?! 
THERESA F. THOMPSON 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT REPRESENTING SELF 
BOX 786 
PARK VALLEY; UTAH 84329 
NO PHONE 
FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 940906495 CV 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Theresa F. Thompson, 
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick entered in this matter on December 23, 1994. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this^^L day of ~fWWw , 1995, 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Theresa F. Thompson 
Box 786 
Park Valley, Utah 84329 
No phone 
I, Theresa F. Thompson, do solemnly affirm that owing to my poverty 
I am unable to bear the expenses of the appeal which I am about to take 
and that I believe 1 am entitled to the relief sought by such appeal. 
Date : & 7/*<r 
CouKfy of todsej^. 
Subscribed and sworn tc 
Affiant 
o before me on ftb- 1, WF5 
date 
Name and ZiJzle of 
Officer Authorized to 
Administer Oath 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
QLENDAJtLEC 
11944 W M 4*79 SOU* 
NN«f*al9, Uttlt 94406 
Hy Commttsio* Expfea* 
Jamitry29.1t» 
STATE OF UTAH 
References: 
Sections 21-7-3 and 21-7-4, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended 
Utah R. App. P. 6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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ft T»t 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH EXHIBIT J 
THERESA F. 
vs 
COMMUNITY 
THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, I 
• » 
NURSING SERVICE, } 
Defendant. ' 
Case No. CIV 940906495 CV 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
OF PROCEEDINGS (MICHAEL 
O'BRIEN'S ARGUMENTS ONLY) 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
on Monday, December 12, 1994 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
THERESA F. THOMPSON 
Pro Se 
MICHAEL PATRICK O'BRIEN 
Attorney at Law 
170 South Main Street #1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
521-3200 
ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
License No. 22-106796-7801 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
535-5203 
€
n 
n 
1 * * * 
2 I MR. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, I don't want to take a 
3 lot of time because our position is stated in the Memorandum, 
4 but essentially, the background on this is that Ms, Thompson 
5 was employed by Community Nursing Service, and at one point 
6 was discharged. Subsequent to that she filed a charge 
7 claiming age discrimination, and that matter was pending 
8 before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. That 
9 charge was investigated by the EEOC and one employee and one 
10 former employee of Communit Nursing Service were interviewed 
11 by the investigator. 
12 Subsequent to that time, a ruling was issued by the 
13 EEOC which is attached to the Memorandum. The ruling 
14 I concluded there was no reasonable cause to believe that 
age discrimination led to Ms. Thompson's discharge. 
After that ruling, Community Nursing was served with 
this lawsuit which alleges that during the course of the EEOC 
proceedings, Ms. Thompson was defamed by statements made 
19
 about her. 
20
 This is a motion to dismiss. For purposes, of 
21 course, of this motion, we assume that the facts and the 
22 statements in the Complaint are true. Notwithstanding 
23 that, your Honor, we believe that they should be dismissed 
24 because they do seek to impose defamation liability for 
25 statements made during the course of a quasi-judicial 
15 
16 
17 
18 
1 proceeding which is absolutely privileged. 
2 There are basically three points that need to be 
3 met to establish this privilege and that's found in the 
4
 Allen v. Ortez case cited in our materials. The first is 
5 that — let me just quote for the Court. The statement 
6 must have been made during the course of the judicial 
7 proceeding. 
8 There's no Utah case law that addresses the issue 
9 of a quasi-judicial proceeding like the EEOC, but we have 
10
 I attached to our Memorandum two cases, one from Washington 
and one from Illinois that conclude the EEOC is a quasi-
judicial proceeding that qualifies for the privilege, and 
13
 I there are various substantial other authorities that 
14
 J indicate quasi-judicial proceedings qualify for the 
privilege. 
So we would submit, your Honor, the first prong 
of the Allen test is met. Second, the statement must have 
some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding. 
Now, the issue before the EEOC was whether or not 
Ms. Thompson was discharged for legitimate reasons, or for 
inappropriate reasons related to her age. Therefore, there 
was some need to respond to the investigator's questions 
about the reasons for the discharge, the disciplinary 
11 
12 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24
 h i s tory , thB perceptions of the c l i e n t toward the individual . 
25 All of Ms. Thompson's statements that she alleges are 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
defamatory relate to those sorts of issues and therefore, 
they have some reference to the quasi-judicial proceeding 
that was involved, and finally, the third prong, your Honor, 
the privilege must have been made — excuse me. The 
statement must have been made by someone acting in the 
litigation, the judge, the juror, litigant or witness, and 
there's no dispute here, I believe Ms. Thompson concedes, 
that that prong is satisfied in this case. 
Based on those three prongs and them being met in 
this case in the face of the pleading, your Honor, we'd ask 
that the lawsuit be dismissed. Thank you. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. O'Brien? 
MR. O'BRIEN: No, your Honor, except I did neglect 
to mention — I apologize — that the Complaint was 
amanded to assert two claims under the criminal code and we 
would include that in our motion to dismiss, and then there 
was a motion for protective order pending, but we don't 
need to address that until the Court rules on the motion to 
dismiss. 
* * * 
1 
2 | REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
3 
4 
5
 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
6
 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
7 
8
 I I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify 
9
 J That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
No. 22-106796-7801, and one of the official court reporters 
of the state of Utah; that on the 12th day of Decembmer, 
1994, I attended the within matter and reported in short-
hand the proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my 
said shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, 
and the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 4, inclusive, 
constitute a full, true and correct account of certain 
excerpted portions of the same, to the best of my ability 
DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, this 1st day of 
February, 199 5. 
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